Researchers at Technische Universität Berlin have demonstrated a physical attack that rolls back firmware TPM lockout counters, turning short Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs from years-long brute-force targets into attacks feasible within days. The work, published as Hello Again, affects AMD-based systems and some Intel laptops whose firmware TPM state is protected by vulnerable replay-protected flash mechanisms. The researchers released technical artifacts, including interposer firmware, circuit-board designs and attack scripts, alongside the paper. The research paper and public repository document the demonstrations. [21][26]
The attack targets the nonvolatile state that firmware TPMs use to track failed authentication attempts. On the AMD laptop tested, the researchers suppressed updates to a replay-protected monotonic counter, allowing an old TPM state—with its failed-attempt count restored—to be written back. On the Intel system, they extracted a signing key from a Winbond SPI flash chip using a voltage glitch, then forged counter values. Both approaches require opening the machine and attaching hardware to the flash chip; this is not a remote exploit or a plug-and-play software attack.
In one demonstration, a four-digit Windows Hello PIN of 1235 was recovered after 236 attempts in 57 minutes on an HP OmniBook 3 with an AMD Ryzen AI 5 330 processor. Windows still required restarts after groups of incorrect entries, but the TPM lockout delay was defeated. A six-digit BitLocker startup PIN, 123457, was recovered after 236 attempts in 6 minutes and 55 seconds on a Framework Laptop 13 powered by an Intel Core Ultra 5 125H. The researchers estimate that the worst-case time for a four-digit Hello PIN falls from about 69 days to roughly 40 hours, while a default six-digit BitLocker PIN drops from about 19 years to approximately 20 to 26 days, depending on the tested configuration. The ACM paper reports the BitLocker estimate as 26 days. [23]
AMD has confirmed one part of the exposure and assigned it CVE-2026-43613. Its AMD-SB-7079 advisory describes insufficient authentication of RPMC increment completion in AMD Secure Processor firmware and rates the issue CVSS 5.1 under CVSS 4.0, with physical access required. AMD lists firmware mitigations for affected Ryzen, Ryzen AI, Threadripper, Athlon and EPYC lines, with target releases running from November 2026 through February 2027; those dates represent planned firmware availability and will generally require system or motherboard-vendor updates. [16][25]
The broader findings are not covered by that AMD CVE alone. The researchers also found that systems without RPMC protection could accept older flash images in some tests, while Winbond flash-chip behavior enabled the key-leakage attack on the Intel platform. Intel said the research did not demonstrate a vulnerability in an Intel component, and the researchers say Winbond has not committed to a fix or schedule. No exploitation outside the laboratory has been reported in the published research or vendor notices.
Until updates arrive, organizations should treat unattended laptops as physical-security risks, install OEM firmware fixes as they become available, and raise Windows Hello and BitLocker PIN minimums to at least six digits or use longer alphanumeric BitLocker startup PINs where supported. Microsoft’s TPM guidance documents a default lockout threshold of 32 failed attempts and a healing interval of 10 minutes, but longer PINs reduce the value of an attack that bypasses that protection. Microsoft’s TPM documentation and the researchers’ artifacts provide the relevant defensive context. [13][21]
References
- Manage TPM lockout
- Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC) Increment Suppression Vulnerability
- Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters …
- GitHub – mattifinder/rpmc_attacks
- AMD Ryzen™ and Ryzen™ Embedded Processor Vulnerabilities – November 2026
- AMD Product Security
